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Space, Postmodernism and Cartographies1 
Jamie Brassett 
 
As the title suggests, this article will concern itself with contemporary 
attitudes towards space. What is less apparent, though, is the necessary 
relationship this will have with questions of subjectivity. I have spent many 
pages elsewhere examining this relationship2 and shall only give a brief 
account of it here. The pressing question for this article to examine is the 
relevance of this discussion to the concerns of postmodernism. This essay 
will chart the movement between space, subjects and postmodernism. 
 
Space and Subjects 
The modern spaced-subject’s story starts with Kant’s Copernican Revolution. 
Just as Copernicus had marked the dawn of astronomical heliocentrism, so 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1787) announce the grounding of 
philosophical concerns within the bounds of a new a spatially constructed 
subject. (This is the accepted philosophical story anyway. That Kant was 
building upon a tradition of philosophical thinkers – Hume is the most famous 
example – is not the place for this article to contend.) What is most 
interesting about Kant’s account is his integrating of the question of space 
and subjectivity.3 Kant showed the ways in which a highly organised subject 
could be produced. But this is not a new subject. Hume, for one, had already 
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identified the subject as the post-production addendum to the process of 
experiencing. Where Kant gleefully delimited this subject’s boundaries with 
the aid of Rationality, it seems that Hue unhappily resigned himself to the 
stagnation of the subject through Habit (Hume 1982: 311–12). Subjective 
solidity has not always been beloved of philosophers. Schopenhauer’s 
aesthetics tries hardest to dissolve that which produces individual subjects. 
Nietzsche provides many tirades against this subject.4 Yet it is the 
Frenchman, Gaston Bachelard – writing one hundred and fifty years after 
Kant – who expands upon the space/subject construction in an attempt to 
enhance new forms of both. 
 Bashelard’s The Poetics of Space (1958) examines a range of human 
experience, as reported through the medium of poetry, in order to reach for 
that which defines the human subject. Unlike the phenomenologists, with 
whom Bachelard has always been associated – apparently with his approval 
– Bachelard’s method was not to pare away at his area of study until its 
essence was exposed. Rather, he sought to amplify the examples of the 
poetic images he was interested in, to expand not inhibit the area on which 
he worked. For Bachelard the poetic imagination highlights the subject in its 
most creative capacity, and it is space that provides the best conditions for 
this creativity: 
 
                                            
4 See Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, (Third Edition: 1859), 
Book I: Sections 31, 34, 38 and 52 (on music), Book II: Ch. XXX (New York: Dover 
Publications Inc., 1966); and Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (1886) (New York: 
Random House Inc., 1966) 17. 
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At times we think we know ourselves in time, when all we know is a 
sequence of fixations in the spaces of being’s stability – a being who 
does not want to melt away, and who, even in the past, when he sets 
out in search of things past [quand Il s’en va à la recherché du temps 
perdu], wants time to “suspend” its flight. In its countless alveoli space 
contains compressed time. That is what space is for. (Bachelard 1969: 
8) 
 
In the Kantian system, too, it is imagination which provides the active arena 
for the synthesis which creates the ground of the subject. Bachelard writes of 
a subjectivity that only has a meaning given the spaces productive of 
imaginative creation. A cursory glance, therefore, reveals that Bachelard’s 
work offers nothing more than a poetically updated Kantianism. Yet it soon 
becomes clear when reading The Poetics of Space that Bachelard is offering 
us something different. Unlike Kant, Bachelard does not propose subjectivity 
as that which places a convenient boundary around cognitive and 
epistemological functions. Bachelard’s subject describes that which 
occupies a variety of spaces; we are stable subjects insofar as we can strung 
together a story linking these spaces. But these stories can change. Hume 
and Nietzsche both argued that it is only through a combination of habit and 
grammar that these stories are assigned an immutable subject position. 
Bachelard’s creative imagination finds space(s) burgeoning with subjects –
that is also what space is for – and serves to organise (or otherwise) these 
subjects into a whole. Imaginative creation, like Kant’s imaginative synthesis, 
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provides the foundation for subjectivity. In the Bachelardian scheme it is the 
imaginative attitude towards space which determines the disposition of the 
subject. Kant’s subject is as tightly organised as the geometrical space that 
informs it. As has been mentioned, Hume and Nietzsche round that the 
acceptance of organised structures governing the concatenation of 
experience lead to a single, simple, habitual subject. 
 The desired outcome for a new understanding of contemporary space 
is its materialisation, in making it mellifluous, liquid or smooth. It is only thus 
that the elements which are determined by space, i.e. subjectivities, become 
similarly materialised. Bachelard called this method for describing material 
spaces (and their subjects) “Topoanalysis”: I call the same method, following 
Guattari “Cartography.” Cartography does not merely outline what it finds 
sitting on the surface, it does not just trace. Cartography glides over the 
surface it maps, slithers and slides across the contours of space which does 
not order the movement of the mapping. Think of Cartography as a vast 
map-making machines. It is a machine which is not described as only the 
sum of its parts; it is created as much by the space it maps, as it is 
productive of that space. Guattari has written that “not only does the map 
put itself to indefinite referral with respect to its proper cartography, but the 
distinction between map and territory (the map and ‘the thing mapped’) 
tends to disappear” (Guattari 1989a: 51, n.1). The Godfather of 




Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or a 
substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or 
reality; a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor 
survives it. Henceforth, it is the map that precedes the territory. 
(Baudrillard 1983: 2) 
 
The Cartographic Machine smoothes space and produces the lines of flight 
which will smash the organised boundaries of The Subject. 
 
Space and Postmodernism 
The best way of mapping the areas of study of this section is the 
presentation of various definitions of postmodern space: to start with, who 
better than Fredric Jameson? In his “Cognitive Mapping” Jameson identifies 
three types of space, or, to be more precise, three stages of capitalist space: 
 
I have tried to suggest that the three historical stages of capital have 
each generated a type of space unique to it . . . . These three types of 
space I have in mind are all the result of discontinuous expansions or 
quantum leaps in the enlargement of capital, in the latter’s penetration 
and colonization of hitherto uncommodified areas. (Jameson 1988: 
348) 
 
The three stages of capitalism Jamesonn identifies are classical, or market 
capitalism; the passage from market to monopoly capitalism, Lenin’s “stage 
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of imperialism” (Jameson 1988: 349); and finally, late capitalism. It is to this 
latter category that postmodern space refers. Jameson, in two more massive 
sentences, writes: 
 
I want to suggest that the new space [postmodern space] involves the 
suppression of distance . . . and the relentless saturation of any 
remaining voids and empty places, to the point where the postmodern 
body – whether wandering through a postmodern hotel, locked into 
rock sounds by means of headphones, or undergoing multiple shocks 
and bombardments of the Vietnam war as Michael Herr conveys it to 
us – is now exposed to a perceptual barrage of immediacy from which 
all sheltering layers have been removed. There are, of course, many 
other features of this space one would ideally like to comment on . . . 
but I think that the peculiar disorientation of the saturated space I have 
just mentioned will be the most useful guiding thread. (Jameson 1988: 
351) 
 
Postmodern space is characterised not by a new conception of space as 
such, but by a new conception of the way space is filled. According to this 
passage the “new space” differs from the old space (a modernist space say) 
in that the elements that pass through it, or occupy it, are no longer orderly 
and evocative of rationality, but are disorderly and evocative of fragmentality. 
Notice the similarity between Jameson’s and David Harvey’s findings viz. 
postmodernism and space. For Harvey, postmodernism identifies the 
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process of “Time-space compression . . .” as the titles of one of the chapters 
of his The Condition of Postmodernity puts it (Harvey 1990: 30). This 
compressed space Harvey describes as follows: 
 
Disruptive spatiality triumphs over the coherence of perspective and 
narrative in postmodern fiction, in exactly the same way that imported 
beers coexist with local brews, local employment collapses under the 
weight of foreign competition, and all the divergent spaces of the 
world are assembles nightly as a collage of images upon the television 
screen. (Harvey 1990: 302) 
 
It is easy to see from where Harvey formulates his Being = Postmodernism, 
Becoming = Modernism dichotomy. Postmodern space provides the 
backdrop against which many types of image can be projected. Being, then, 
would describe the backdrop as the only possibility for unification of these 
images, which is very postmodern and reflexive; whereas Harvey’s Becoming 
would define the narrative structure (if there was one) of the images 
presented, and is thus very modernist. In any case, space is seen simply as 
an all pervading emptiness punctuated intermittently by coagulations called 
“place.” 
 In his article, “The Meaning of ‘Space’ in Kant,’ Ivor Leclerc examines 
the movement, in Classical Modern philosophy, from a “concrete” 
articulation of space, to an “abstract” one. Leclerc shows that the sixteenth-, 
seventeenth-, and early eighteenth-century notions of space adhered to the 
 8 
Aristotelian definition: whereby space was linked with place as the 
“innermost bounding surface of the containing body – which of course 
coincided with the outer boundary of the contained body” (Leclerc 1974: 88). 
Descartes began the abstraction of space by tying it more with the idea of 
magnitude, and place with situation. Leibniz carried it further by identifying 
space not only with all places in their totality, but the abstracted order of all 
such places too. Kant’s space is also an abstract, formal, totalising and 
organising space. A foetid space, where subjects are born to be constrained; 
the type of space Beckett defines in Waiting for Godot (1965) in the following 
suitably macabre and cynical way: “They give birth astride a grave, the light 
gleams an instant, then it’s night once more” (Beckett 1965: 89). 
 Jameson’s saturation bombing of postmodern space by fragementary 
images, delimits a type of space which he calls “disorientating” and which 
we can characterise as dead space ordered along Kantian lines. Jameson 
states that the “new space involves the suppression of distance”; the 
consequent conglomerates of fragmentary stuff are merely tightly 
constrained ways of organising objects in a postmodern schema. However 
Jameson approaches this space, his account never strays far from one in 
which the idea of an abstract, totalised space (that can be saturated in the 
postmodern manner) is paramount. Harvey’s postmodern space articulates 
the same totalising and abstract formulation of a global space ordered 
according to the transcendent movements and relations of Capital, and filled 
with various places articulated according to the diversion and solidification of 
capital at a point. Harvey’s map, like Jameson’s is a highly organised 
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representation of a single empty space that is, however, occupied by 
fragmentary places. He writes: 
 
Capital, in short, continues to dominate, and it does so n part through 
a superior command over space and time, even when opposition 
movements gain control over a particular space for a time. The 
“otherness” and “regional resistances” that postmodernist politics 
emphasize can flourish in a particular place. But they are all too often 
subject to the power of capital over the coordination of universal 
fragmented space and the mark of capitalism’s global historical time 
that lies outside the purview of any particular one of them. (Harvey 
1990: 238–39) 
 
So what Harvey describes here as the “universal fragmented space” of 
postmodernism can be interpreted as merely another series of places under 
the overpowering gaze of a truly universal spatialisation of capitalism. There 
is fragmented space and spaces that drive towards homogenisation. 
 In his monumental book The Production of Space (1991) Henri 
Lefebvre describes the constitution and proliferation of a material (or, maybe 
it would be more precise to say “a materialist’s . . .”) space., under the 
auspices of – as the title suggests – its “production.” He never tries to 
transplant any of his theses into faddish cultural organisations – remaining 
true to his lifelong adherence to Marxism. His project, similar to those 
promoted by both Harvey and Jameson, is stated as follows: 
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Our present analysis will not attain its full meaning until political 
economy has been reinstated as the way to understand productive 
activity. But a new political economy must no longer concern itself 
with things in space, as did the now obsolete science that preceded it; 
rather, it will have to be a political economy of space (and of its 
production). (Lefebvre 1991: 299) 
 
It is an economics of space, of the spaces productive of subjectivities, and of 
space as produced according to a political economy (Guattari’s 
ecology/ecosophy) that will interest Lefebvre. What is more important, given 
the discussion currently underway concerning the production of various 
histories of space (by Harvey and Jameson), is the history of space given by 
Lefebvre. He characterises it in terms similar to those adopted by Leclerc; for 
Lefebvre, the understanding/production of space has changed from an 
Absolute to an Abstract one. The former Lefebvre describes thus: 
 
Absolute space was made up of fragments of nature located at sites 
which were chosen for their intrinsic qualities (cave, mountain top, 
spring, river), but whose very consecration ended up by stripping the 
of their natural characteristics and uniqueness. Thus natural space 
was soon populated by political forces Typically, architecture picked a 
site in nature and transferred it to the political realm by means of a 
symbolic mediation; one thinks, for example, of the statues of local 
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gods or goddesses in Greek temples, or of the Shinotist’s sanctuary, 
empty or else containing nothing but a mirror. (Lefebvre 1991: 48; 
Lefebvre’s emphasis) 
 
This space is the space produced and invested by magical and religious 
symbolism. It is not wholly supplanted by abstract space, for it forms the 
basis of what Lefebvre terms (and we shall describe later) “representational 
space.” Absolute space seems a naïve space, the space which Bachelard 
would have loved as productive of dreams, like an opiate (in Bachelard’s 
case, more like Brandy). Nevertheless, this space is not devoid of its 
organisations and political affiliations. This is the space of Imperial Rome, the 
cathedrals of the Holy Roman Empire and the commercial squares of the 
early mercantile town. It is in terms of these facets that absolute space is 
taken over by abstract space. 
 
Abstract space functions “objectally,” as a set of things/signs and their 
formal relationships: glass and stone, concrete and steel, angles and 
curves, full and empty. Formal and quantitative, it erases distinctions, 
as much those which derive from nature and (historical) time as those 
which originate in the body (age, sex, ethnicity). (Lefebvre 1991: 49) 
 
Abstract space is not homogenous; it simply has homogeneity as its 
goal, its orientation, its “lens.” And, indeed, it renders homogenous. 
But in itself it is multiform. Its geometric and visual formants are 
 12 
complimentary in their antithesis. (Lefebvre 1991: 287. Lefebvre’s 
emphases) 
 
Lefebvre’s abstract space is thus slightly different to that introduced by 
Leclerc (though Lefebvre does adorn another of his descriptions of it with a 
philosophical lineage fro Descartes to Hegel (see Lefebvre 1991: 308)). The 
most interesting notion introduced here by Lefebvre with respect to abstract 
space, is its drive to homogenise. In this way we can  understand abstract 
space in Bachelardian terms as “geometricizing”; in Deleuze and Guattarian 
terms as “reterritorialising”; and in Kantian terms as “organising.” Throughout 
my work, these terms are used to characterise that space which is 
productive of the most repressed, neurotic and oppressed forms of 
subjectivity. In this essay alone, we have seen that it is this type of space that 
provides the conditions according to which the Subject Dies. Indeed, 
“abstract space,” with its “multiform” fragmentations being forcibly brought 
under a unified political control, is that space we have been describing as 
postmodern, the time of Death of the Subject. 
 Jameson’s “new space,” which I have characterised as abstract 
following Leclerc’s analysis of Kant, we can now see as abstract in the terms 
offered by Lefebvre. Abstract space is that space which is defined, delimited 
and policed by global capitalism; it is constituted, or, rather, poly-sected 
(rather than being merely bisected) by fragmentary spaces/stuff which it must 
bring under control. In so doing it provides for the Jameson-type saturated 
places particular of postmodernism. Where Lefebvre’s analysis transgresses 
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Jameson’s is in the more fluid history that he writes. We saw above that for 
Lefebvre abstract space did not merely supersede absolute space, but that 
the latter remained underground, so to speak. Jameson’s formulation, 
however, relates different spaces to different stages in the “enlargement of 
capital.” His history is far more rigid that Lefebvre’s, and anything 
overflowing from the previous stage of capital is soon dissipated, or 
subsumed by the (term) postmodern. It is here that we should return to the 
point intimated at the outset of the description of Lefebvre’s 
absolute/abstract distinction.  
 Like Guattari in his Les Trois ecologies (1989b) – and even like 
Jameson – Lefebvre provides a tripartite structure according to which an 
economics of space can be oriented. He provides the following co-ordinates: 
1. Spatial Practice; 2. Representation of Space; and 3. Representational 
Space. The first of these, spatial practice, can be broadly understood as 
social space. It describes the space(s) produced and provided in everyday 
life: “It embodies a close association, within perceived space, between daily 
reality (daily routine) and urban reality the routes an networks which link up 
the places set for work, ‘private’ life and leisure)” (Lefebvre 1991: 38). 
(Bachelard would call this “lived-in space,” my emphasis.) Representations of 
space describe 
 
conceptualized space, the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, 
technocratic subdividers and social engineers, as of a certain type of 
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artist with a scientific bent – all of whom identify what is lived and what 
is perceived with what is conceived. (Lefebvre 1991: 38) 
 
This we have termed geometric(ised) space, space which can be cut-up and 
apportioned separate roles. Finally Lefebvre introduces representational 
space. This space is lived space, lived “through its associated images and 
symbols, and hence the space of ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users,’ but also of some 
artists and perhaps of those, such as a few writers and philosophers, who 
describe and aspire to do no more that describe” (Lefebvre 1991: 39; 
Lefebvre’s emphasis). This is the space of the imagination, the space which 
symbolically overlays real-perceived space. This is the re-entry point for 
Lefebvre’s Absolute space into the Abstract. Representational space 
describes in more detail the type of space Bachelard dreams in and thus 
dreams define it. (It is interesting to note that for Lefebvre some philosophers 
are allowed into this space, whereas Bachelard constantly lamented the 
philosopher’s exclusion from such practices (Bachelard 1969: 147).) Having 
used Bacherlardian terms to embellish Lefebvre’s description of this type of 
space, I think we should note that Lefebvre’s description appears far colder 
that Bachelard’s; that is, Lefebvre does not allow himself to be carried on the 
wings of reverie as does Bachelard, indeed, Lefebvre’s analysis seems to 
contain mild opprobrium of such activities. Nevertheless, I think the 
comparison still stands. 
 These three axes provide the co-ordinates according to which 
Lefebvre produces his space-productive histories/economies. Absolute and 
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abstract underpin and interact with each other in terms of these three axes. 
On the whole, abstract space may have supplanted absolute insofar as we 
take the perspective of perceived and conceived space; but, as was stated 
above, with reference to the representational, lived space, or even dreamed 
space, the absolute still lingers. What this shows us is that though Lefebvre’s 
desire to institute a new kind of “political economy” along the lines of an 
analysis of the production, or types of production, of space appears on one 
level just another archaic, systematised, unificatory machine, on another level 
it introduces many points of dislocation which undermine any attempt at 
totalisation or systematisiation. Perhaps the best citation of his project that 
Lefebvre gives in his The Production of Space comes in the final pragraphs, 
e.g.: 
 
The creation (or production) of a planet-wide space as the social 
foundation of a transformed everyday life open to myriad opportunities 
– such is the dawn now beginning to break on the far horizon . . . . 
 I speak of orientation advisedly. We are concerned with nothing 
more and nothing less than that. We are concerned with what might 
be called a “sense”: an organ that perceives, a direction that may be 
conceived, and a directly lived movement progressing towards the 
horizon. And we are concerned with nothing that even remotely 
resembles a system. (Lefebvre 1991: 422–3; Leverbre’s emphasis) 
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Here the three axes that have provided Lefebvre with sometimes immovable 
critical co-ordinates now open out towards a realm in which they are used to 
determine the production of a new space. Lefebvre’s absolute space 
abstract space movement that we have described as the formation of 
postmodern space is not only circumvented by poly-sected by the triadic 
critique of the production of space. Indeed, when this triadic critique begins 
to oscillate itself – as the quotation above shows – then any semblance of 
critical rigidity in Lefebvre’s work must disappear. 
 To recap: Jameson provides a historical reification of space-
production in terms of the changes in capitalism since the late-eighteenth, 
early-nineteenth centuries. Harvey provides an excellent analysis of the 
contemporary postmodern space and its relation to capitalism. In both cases 
the contemporary space – according to which we must articulate and 
constitute subjectivities – is one which is sickeningly putrid. Yet neither 
Jameson nor Harvey offer us any alternative. Jameson is content to try to 
forge a political praxis from within this space; whereas Harvey yearns for the 
good old days of the Modernist space, before the subject dies (or had the 
life-support machine’s plugs pulled on it) and when the future was one that 
could be forged. As the quotation immediately above shows (as does the one 
below), Lefebvre does offer us an alternative. To the type of Marxist nostalgia 
that Harvey exhibits Lefebvre has the following advice: 
 
The hypothesis of an ultimate and preordained meaning of historical 
becoming collapses in face of an analysis of the strategies deployed 
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across the surface of the planet . . . The transformation of society 
presupposes a collective ownership and management of space 
founded on a permanent participation of the “interested parties,” with 
their multiple, varied and even contradictory interests. It thus also 
presupposes confrontation – and indeed this has already emerged in 
the problems of the “environment” . . . (Lefebvre 1991: 418, 422)5 
 
It is the alternative view of space that Lefebvre offers that will provide us with 
an articulation of the cartographies necessary not only to revivify our notion 
of space, but to reorient our notion of subjectivity too, so that we have 
neither the stagnant formations productive of oppression (i.e. the Subject in 
Its Privatised Space) nor the vagaries of postmodern inaction (the Dead 
Subject in Its Foetid Hole). 
 
Final Remarks 
A material space, a space which oozes, is a necessary production of both the 
dislocation of the map/thing-mapped dialectic and the promotion of the 
myriad vectors constitutive of subjectification. It is in the creation of a 
material space, in what Deleuze and Guattari describe as the 
schizophrenisation of the flows constructive of capitalism, in the destruction 
of the Dead Subject (and the postmodern charnel house which has protected 
not only those pondering over the corpse, but which has provided the site for 
those offering theoretical libations to it too in the name of (Under Written) 
                                            
5 See Guattari 1989b: 134, 139 and 142. 
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Being and The Other), in the burgeoning of those vectors of subjectification 
according to which a multitude of subjective assemblages can be built, in 
short, in cartography, that “politically coherent collective praxes” (Guattari 
1989c: 145) are created. Given the terms and desires of this article, what, 
then, are the consequences of these praxes? 
 1. Politically Coherent. It would seem that these two words – maybe 
“coherent” especially – consign the whole of this project back into the realms 
of systematic, totalising and homogenising discourse. Yet this is not the case. 
In his “The Three Ecologies” Guattari explains: 
 
Not only is it necessary not to homogenise the various levels of 
practice – not to join the under the aegis of some transcendent 
insistence; we have also to engage them in processes of 
heterogenesis. Feminists will never be involved enough in a becoming-
woman; and there is no reason to ask the immigrant population to 
renounce the cultural features of its being, or its membership of a 
particular nationality. Our objective should be to nurture individual 
cultures, while at the same time inventing new contracts of citizenship: 
to create an order of the state in which singularity, exceptions and 
rarity coexist under the least oppressive possible conditions. (Guattari 
1989c: 139; Guattari’s emphasis; translation modified) 
 
To promote the burgeoning of subjective vectors against the solidification of 
subjects is to announce the validity of multiple loci of existential possibilities. 
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This is why questions of spaces and subjectivities are so utterly intertwined. 
What Guattari call here “new contracts of citizenship” are merely 
cartographies: the definition/construction of existential territories according 
to which vectors of subjectivity can operate without fear of oppression or 
totalising organisation. In the end, or in the beginning, membership of any 
one group – that is, the ability to flow through any one margin or territory –
 will be as fluid and transitory as the subjectivities which orient it. It is in this 
respect that “politically coherent”  vectors intimate towards “collective 
praxes.” 
 2. Collective Praxes. Once more must we read a passage from 
Guarrati’s “The Three Ecologies”: 
 
The aim of Hegelian and Marxist dialectics was the “resolution” of 
opposites. This is no longer the objective of eco-logic. Certainly, in the 
field of social ecology in particular, there will be times of struggle in 
which all men and women feel the need to set common objectives and 
act “like little soldiers” – by which I mean good activists. But there will 
also be periods of resingularisation, in which individual and collective 
subjectivities will “reclaim their due,” and in which creative expression 
as such will take precedence over collective goals. (Guattari 1989c: 
139–40) 
Under any circumstances will it be possible to hook up various subjective 
assemblages, to synchronise vectors of subjectivity, to congregate 
singularities to achieve particular, fleeting goals. Assemblages and 
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collectives can be created and destroyed without any fear of being slapped 
by some political, ideological super-ego. Indeed, collective action will be 
easier to achieve without the forbidding structure of a hierarchy of subjects 
or privileged groupings. Thus it is that what Guattari describes as “politically 
coherent collective praxes” can be given another articulation as 
“cartographies of subjectification.” This is also the outcome of the 
Bachelardian liquification of space, Deleuze and Guattari’s smoothing of 
space by the Nomad War Machine, and the space-production of Lefebvre. 
 Kant’s subject was always constrained to be an obsessional neurotic 
neatly arranging its organs, its constitutive pieces, into ever-cleaner, more 
rational spaces, in order that it could function on a level of the most numbing 
normality. The subhect – whose brief affirmation of sunlight, as it plopped 
into the grave, provided it with a story about consciousness to range against 
the assertion of it being still-born – now provides the site for virulent 
cartographic suppuration. Like Artaud’s plague-theatre attacking and 
infecting the body-politic worthy of it, this cartography will disorganise the 
pieces constitutive of the subject. Like Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomes 
sprouting from the organised branches of arborealist thought, cartography 
will disrupt the privatised spaces emptied for individual use by capitalism. 
Like Bachelard’s dreamed topoanalysis, oozing up and down, in and out of 
the house of reason, the cartographic pullulance will be utterly indiscriminate, 
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